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 ing the status of religious beliefs relative to our beliefs as a whole; in other words,
 is there something about religious beliefs that warrants their being treated as
 unique epistemic cases? Where Audi would require that religious beliefs, in order
 to be appropriate for the public square, must be accompanied by some nonrelig-
 ious chaperone, Wolterstorff places religious beliefs on equal footing with other
 beliefs as a viable basis for political debate and action. This equalitarian episte-
 mology does not come without cost, however. It is achieved only by rejecting the
 demand that all beliefs, in order to be considered knowledge, must be justified
 in terms of some set of shared criteria of rationality available to, and binding on,
 all parties involved in the debate.
 It remains to be seen whether the apparent inability of liberal apologists, in-
 cluding Audi, to provide an acceptable account of the proper relationship be-
 tween politics and religion is best understood as a defeat for anything resembling
 a modern project or, rather, as a sign that modernity still awaits a political theory
 consistent with its valid and essential aims and insights. While Wolterstorff would
 no doubt claim the former, the latter, for the time being, remains a viable conclu-
 sion. At the very least, those interested in preserving some version of a modern
 project ought to reevaluate their commitments to liberalism as the political theory
 du jour, especially those who desire a political theory that treats fairly the reli-
 gious believer as a legitimate participant in democratic politics. This can only be
 achieved, it seems to me, by adopting something like Wolterstorff's equalitarian
 epistemology-the bracketing of religious beliefs from the public square ought
 no longer to be accepted based on the arguments offered by current liberal politi-
 cal theory.
 Audi and Wolterstorff have provided us with a robust exchange, one that is
 accessible to a wide audience yet sophisticated enough to appeal to specialists in
 the field. As political theorists and philosophers continue to take up these issues,
 they would be wise to turn to this text for guidance on how to understand these
 questions from the perspective of contemporary philosophers of religion.
 BRETT T WILMOT, Chicago, Illinois.
 MAPEL, DAVID R., and NARDIN, TERRY, eds. International Society: Diverse Ethical Per-
 spectives. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. x+263 pp. $35.00
 (cloth).
 "Anyone who takes in hand a table of cross-national socioeconomic indicators,"
 writes David Miller, "is likely to feel at once that the present constitution of inter-
 national society is radically unjust" (p. 164). Articulating a credible perspective
 from which to address this injustice is the task proposed for David Mapel and
 Terry Nardin's contributors. Thirteen chapters are framed by the editors' intro-
 duction and a retrospective conclusion by Mapel alone.
 In the main, the results are more satisfying than Nardin and Mapel's earlier
 collection, Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge, 1992), if only because the
 positions are presented in point/counterpoint fashion, with Nardin's presentation
 of "rule of law positivism" balanced by Frederick Whelan's essay "Legal Positivism
 and International Society," Robert George's "Natural Law and International Or-
 der" taken on by Richard Friedman's "Some Thoughts on Natural Law and Inter-
 national Order," and so on, covering additionally the Kantian, contractarian, and
 cosmopolitan approaches to international ethics. The essays by David Novak, Max
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 Stackhouse, and Sohail Hashmi are billed as "theological commentaries," but they
 are solid and independently valuable essays.
 Whether they ground law and ethics in God, reason, or human nature, or
 follow John Charvet in "rejecting moral realism and accepting the view that moral
 norms and their authority are a human invention" (p. 115), all of the authors
 recognize the need to balance the pursuit of justice with the independence of
 the various states and peoples who constitute international society; justice and
 independence are both important goods, and they are not necessarily commen-
 surable. This incommensurability comes out particularly in matters of religion.
 For example, given his affinity with the Catholic tradition, George's remark that
 "respect for the integrity of legitimate cultures is itself a requirement of natural
 justice" (p. 67) is bound to raise eyebrows. What makes a culture legitimate or,
 more importantly, illegitimate may not be so easy to determine.
 On the flip side, Charvet's contractarian theory requires a minimal commit-
 ment to liberal values, and Islamic states, he suggests, will experience "a serious
 problem of adherence. For what their legitimizing principles prescribe domesti-
 cally as constituting just cooperation is incompatible with the liberal principles
 that they are required to follow internationally" (p. 127). Brian Berry, sketching
 "a cosmopolitan perspective," encounters a similar problem in "the Hindu Varna
 system" but suggests that such a system need not be accorded any legitimacy,
 since "anybody could reasonably reject basing an inegalitarian social system on a
 set of religious beliefs, since these beliefs could themselves reasonably be rejected"
 (p. 158). What counts as "reasonable rejection" is no more self-evident than it is
 for "legitimate culture."
 When David Novak writes that "the range of persons who can make moral
 claims is largely dependent on whether or not they are the kind of people those
 in power can and want to communicate with" (p. 197), he reflects a worry shared
 by Stackhouse and Hashmi that the some "generally fictitious situation, such as a
 'state of nature' or an 'original position"' (p. 198) will be used to rule religious
 voices out of order in debates about the shape of international society and subse-
 quently, perhaps, rule them out of order altogether. That such a cavalier attitude
 toward religion is questionable, at best, is nicely brought out by Miller, who
 remarks apropos of Barry's cosmopolitanism that, "without imbibing a large dose
 of religious skepticism" (p. 178), it is hard to see how the basic tenets of liberal-
 ism differ, in terms of reasonable rejectability, from religious ones. As long as
 fundamental differences remain in matters of ethics, religion, and human well-
 being, what is reasonable from one perspective will remain contentious from
 others.
 The most important issue in international ethics is not, I think, the status of
 international law or the various schemes for securing distributive justice but the
 justification of military intervention, even for humanitarian purposes. The ex-
 change between the Kantians is instructive. Pierre Laberge recognizes that "the
 UN has no chance of surviving without the principle of nonintervention," and he
 attempts to justify that principle on the grounds that "Kant praises linguistic and
 religious plurality as a tool used by nature to protect us from the advent of a
 despotic (vs. republican) world State" (pp. 98-99). Fernando Tes6n, however, re-
 jects this as "a realist trap" (p. 108) and insists that "in extreme circumstances,
 force may [be] the only means to defend the liberal alliance against dictators or
 to rescue their victims" (pp. 111-12). Few may doubt that Pol Pot was a murder-
 ous dictator, but when, how, and by whom he should have been stopped is still a
 matter of debate. Does a New Guinea tribe that considers fellatio between male
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 initiates essential constitute a "legitimate culture?" If not, should the practice be
 put down? Is repelling invasion to secure an uninterrupted flow of oil an instance
 of just war? Until these and similar questions are dealt with, international ethics
 will remain a wide open field.
 ScorT DAVIS, University of Richmond.
 EVANS, MALCOLM D. Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 1997. xxxi+394 pp. $79.95 (cloth).
 There is an obvious tension between "state sovereignty" and universal human
 rights. Under the sovereignty principle, each state has the authority to make its
 own decisions about the nature of its government and the rights its citizens may
 possess. The concept of universal human rights, on the other hand, presupposes
 that human beings are entitled to the fundamental rights of freedom of con-
 science and freedom of expression regardless of what governments might other-
 wise allow.
 Malcolm Evans's Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe is an exceed-
 ingly well-researched, indexed, and documented work that examines, from both
 historical and current perspectives, international legal protections of the rights of
 religion, conscience, and belief on the European continent. The first two chapters
 consider the historical background of the issue from ancient times through World
 War I. Chapters 3 through 6 examine the League of Nations and the short-lived
 interwar minority treaties. The remaining eight chapters focus on the approaches
 to the topic taken by the United Nations and the human rights conventions it
 has sponsored (chaps. 7-9), the European Convention on Human Rights
 (chaps. 10-13), and the final chapter touches on the Organization for Security and
 Cooperation in Europe and some recent attempts to draft new minority treaties.
 The book will serve as a valuable reference work for international lawyers and
 human rights activists who are concerned with the protection of rights of religion
 and belief. It contains valuable drafting histories of the Covenant of the League
 of Nations, of the interwar minority treaties, and of the freedom of conscience
 articles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the (European)
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
 (1950), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the
 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimina-
 tion Based on Religion or Belief (1981). The book also provides a lawyerly study
 of the decisions on religion made by the European Court of Human Rights and
 the European Commission of Human Rights through the end of 1996. Its bibliog-
 raphy is reasonably comprehensive, although it does not include three important
 works that were published recently (Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr.,
 eds., Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 2 vols. [The Hague, 1996]; Ba-
 hiyyih G. Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection [The Hague, 1996]; Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, eds., Freedom of Reli-
 gion and Belief. A World Report [London, 1997]).
 Although the book pulls together a significant amount of learning on the topics
 identified above, potential readers should be aware that there are two topics that
 one might have thought would be fully considered but are not. First, the book
 does not attempt to integrate the broader theme of religious toleration into that
 of international legal protection of rights of religion and belief. Thus Montaigne,
 John Locke, and Pierre Bayle are not cited, although Alberico Gentili and Hugo
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